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Abstract—In this paper, we describe a novel game-theoretic
formulation of the optimal mobile agents placement prob-
lem which arises in the context of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
(MANETs). In particular, we consider two classes of multistage
games: sequential and simultaneous. For such games, the
definitions of the Nash equilibria and the cooperative solution
are given. The described games exhibit a number of interesting
features. For instance, the Nash equilibrium may turn out to be
unattainable in both a simultaneous and a sequential game. In
this case, the game dynamics may exhibit the behaviour similar
to that of a limit cycle albeit in a discrete space. A modelling
environment for the analysis of different strategies of the
players was developed in MATLAB. The programme generates
various game situations and determines each players move by
solving respective optimisation problems. Using the developed
environment, two specific game scenarios were considered in
detail.
Keywords–MANET; Dynamic games; Multistage games;
Drone placement; Graphs; Nash equilibria
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the quali-
tative analysis and performance optimisation of Mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANETs). A MANET is a network with
no predefined infrastructure that consists of a collection
of wireless mobile nodes/agents [1]. MANETs play an
increasingly important role and have many applications such
as disaster recovery after a natural catastrophe, for instance
after an earth quake, search-and-rescue operations and so
forth [2]. One of the biggest problems associated with the
operation of a MANET is the need to share/use limited
resources for transmission of radio waves. Inappropriate use
of the resources can cause a severe degradation in network
performance [3].
When the number of nodes wanting to transmit data
increases some of the routing paths become congested and
performance drops [4], [5]. In some cases the obstacles on
the ground (lakes, buildings, etc.) cause link breakages. In
order to mitigate against the congestion of a given link, or
to fix link breakage, drones can be used.
Introducing mobile agents (drones) and finding the best
possible locations for them is the focus of this research.
Typically, the number of drones is rather limited so they
should be placed in order to maximally increase the perfor-
mance of the network. Apart from that, a common situation
is that there are several groups of nodes which are deployed
to solve their specific tasks. These nodes may or may not
be able to communicate with each other. The latter case
corresponds to the situation when, e.g., the nodes from
different groups use different frequency ranges [6].
We address the described problem in a decentralised
manner. That is, we assume that each group of nodes has
a single control centre which is in possession of a single
drone. The goal of the control centre is to place the drone
in order to maximise the performance of the subnetwork
formed by own nodes.
It turns out that Game theory lends itself perfectly to ad-
dressing the described problem. Game theory is a powerful
tool to study situations of sharing limited resources, and
it is dealing with finding the best actions for individual
decision makers (players) and finding the best available
outcome [7], [8]. Using the game-theoretic methods one can
explicitly design and analyse strategic choices and model
the decision-making process for the player according to
their own interests. Much of the research conducted in
the application of the game theory to the area of mobile
networks is related to malicious/selfish nodes detection [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13].
In this paper, we take a different approach and apply game
theory to a special class of network optimization problem
as described below. Note that there are a number of results
on games as applied to networks (see, e.g., [14] and [15]).
However, this particular problem statement appears to be
novel thus opening wide opportunities for further research.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we give
a formal description of the considered objects and introduce
the mathematical notation that will be used hereafter. In
Section III we present the game-theoretic formulation of the
drone placement problem. Section IV contains a number of
numerical examples, while in Section V we draw conclu-
sions and outline the directions of future research.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Two types of communication networks
We consider the set N = {1, . . . , N} of N players, each
player i ∈ N has a non-empty set Mi = {1, . . . ,Mi}
of agents. Each agent aji ∈ Mi, i ∈ N is characterised
by a pair of coordinates (xji , y
j
i ). We assume that the
agents can be located at the vertices of a uniform tiling
of a connected subset of the Euclidean plane C ⊂ R2.
In practice, one considers three kinds of uniform tiling:
the triangular, the Cartesian (integer), and the hexagonal
tiling which are formed by unit equilateral triangles, squares,
and hexagons. Henceforth we will denote the set of all
admissible coordinates by W ⊂ C. In the case of Cartesian
grid, the coordinates of admissible points are the pairs of
integer, i.e., W ⊂ N2 ∩ C.
The agents form a communication network whose struc-
ture is determined by the spatial alignment of agents. While
the very nature of a MANET suggests a dynamic topology,
we look at a snapshot of the network at a given point in
time. Thus, we assume that the communication network
formed by the respective agents does not change with time.
In the following, we will consider two types of communi-
cation structures: separate and joint use of communication
infrastructure. We denote these two types of communication
networks by S (separate) and J (joint). Below we consider
these two cases in more detail.
S-network: The communication network consists of N
disjoint graphs GSi = (VSi , ESi ), i ∈ N , where the sets of
vertices VSi = {vki = (xki , yki )}Mik=1 are the collections of the
Cartesian coordinates of agents of player i; the sets of edges
ESi = {ek,si = (vki , vsi ) ∈ VSi × VSi : dist(vki , vsi ) = 1} are
the sets of all pairs of agents for player i that are at a unit
Euclidean distance from each other. Note that the coordinate
grid is such that the distance between two neighbouring
points is always equal to 1. We assume that each graph
GSi is connected, i.e., there is a connected path between any
two agents of a player. Note that there are no connections
(links) between the elements of different subgraphs, i.e., the
agents of one player do not participate in the transmission
between the agents of another player.
J-network: This case corresponds to a single communi-
cation network whose communication structure is modelled
by the graph GJ = (VJ , EJ), where the set of vertices
VJ = {vki = (xki , yki )}, i ∈ N , k ∈ Mi is the collection
of the Cartesian coordinates of all agents; the set of edges
EJ = {ek,s = (vki , vsj ) ∈ VJ × VJ : dist(vki , vsj ) = 1}
is the set of all pairs of agents that are at a unit Euclidean
distance from each other. As in the previous case, we assume
that the graph GJ is connected, i.e., there is a connected path
between any two agents.
Note that in both cases the coordinates of agents of two
different players can coincide. While in the case of the
S-network this would mean that the graphs may overlap
(they can be considered to lie in different layers), for the J-
network this would imply that there is no direct connection
between two agents located in the same point. This can
be relaxed by defining the set of edges to be the set of
all pairs of agents at the distance less or equal to 1, i.e.,
E˜J = {ek,s = (vki , vsj ) ∈ VJ × VJ : dist(vki , vsj ) ≤ 1}.
Note also that the choice of the grid can influence the
connectivity of the respective graphs and the related charac-
teristics. While any agent located on a hexagonal grid can
have at most adjoin 3 edges, for the triangular grid this
number can be up to 6.
B. Graph theoretic ingredients
Before proceeding to the game-theoretic formulation of
the problem we present a couple of facts from graph theory
which will be used hereafter.
Let G = (V, E) be a graph and s be an agent. We define
the union G˜ = G ∪ s to be a new graph with an extended
set of vertices V˜ = V ∪ s and the accordingly adjusted set
of edges E˜ . The union operation can be obviously extended
to the case G ∪ S, where S is a set of agents S = {si}ki=1.
Note that G˜ can be disconnected.
The diameter of the graph G, denoted by D(G), is the
maximum among all shortest paths between the agents in
the graph, D(G) = max
(vi,vj)∈V×V
d(vi, vj), where d(vi, vj) is
the graph distance between two vertices vi and vj which
is defined as the minimum length of the paths connecting
them. If no such path exists, d(vi, vj) =∞.
Since each graph GSi is connected, for the integer grid the
diameter can be roughly estimated as
2(b
√
Mi c − 1) ≤ D(GSi ) ≤Mi − 1.
Obviously, while the upper bound does not depend on the
type of the grid, the lower bound does. Namely, it is minimal
for the triangular grid and maximal for the hexagonal one.
Furthermore, let Vi be a disjoint partition of the set of ver-
tices V of the graph G. We define the diameter of the graph
G with respect to Vi as D(G,Vi) = max
(vi,vj)∈Vi×Vi
d(vi, vj).
That is to say, when computing D(G,Vi) we consider only
the paths between the pairs of vertices from Vi. However, the
intermediate vertices in the respective paths are not required
to be in Vi.
C. Mobile agent: drone
Each player has a mobile agent (drone) qi at their disposal.
The drone is placed at any admissible point in W . While all
the agents have fixed coordinates, the position of the moving
agent qi, i ∈ N can be changed during the game. The
link between the moving agent and another agent is defined
similarly to the links between the stationary agents. The
moving agent qi can establish a link with any other moving
agent qj and with any stationary agent v
p
i , p ∈Mi, i ∈ N .
At the initial time all drones are assumed to be located at
some initial position qo. We also assume that the Euclidean
distance between qo and the agents is greater than 1, i.e.,
dist(qo, vki ) > 1∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Mi. That is to say, the initial
position of the drones is such that they cannot establish
communication with the agents of any other player.
Finally, we denote the set of all drones by Q = {qi}Ni=1




For any type of communication structure the ith player
solves the following optimisation problem:
q¯i = arg min
qi∈W∗i
D(G∗i ,Vi), (1)
where G∗ is the extended graph and W ∗i = W \ Q−i is
the set of admissible locations for the ith drone. For the
case of S-network, G∗i = GSi ∪Q, for the J-network: G∗i =
G ∪Q. This can be interpreted as follows: at each step the
ith player aims at placing its moving agent qi such that it
minimises the diameter of the respective graph computed
for all player’s agents. Note that the drones themselves are
not considered when computing the diameter of the graph
as they are not assumed to be the sources of any useful
information, but merely transmit the information packages
between the agents. In this statement, we assume that each
drone can be used by the agents of any player. The set of
admissible locations W ∗i is introduced to avoid the collision
of two drones.
Accordingly, the pay-off (utility) function of the ith player
is defined as the difference between the diameter of the
respective graph before placing the drone and afterwards:
Hi(G, Q) = D(G∗i ,Vi)−D(G¯∗i ,Vi) ≥ 0, (2)
where G¯∗i = GSi ∪ Q−i ∪ {q¯i} or G¯∗i = GJ ∪ Q−i ∪ {q¯i},
respectively. Note that the pay-off function is always non-
negative.
We will modify this definition for the multi-staged game
in the subsequent section.
B. Game aims and strategic (normal) form
The idea of the game is that each of the players aims to
place its moving agent such that it minimises the maximal
distance between the player’s agents while taking into ac-
count the existing communication infrastructure. The degree
by which the player minimises the mentioned distance is
captured by the pay-off function (2). Thus the goal of the
player is to maximise its pay-off function. The game finishes
if none of the players can maximise further the respective
pay-off function.
The game is now formulated in normal form, [16], i.e.,
the game is a triple
Γ = {N , S,H},
where N is the set of players; S = ∏
i∈N
Si is a Cartesian
product of strategy sets Si and Si is the set of available
strategies for player i; H is a vector-valued function such
that for any given communication infrastructure G, Hi : S →
R is the utility (pay-off) function for player i.
The size of the action set of each player is limited from
above: |Si| ≤ |W | − N + 1. This estimate shows that our
game is discrete and finite. However, the above estimate can
be greatly improved. For instance, for the rectangular grid
and S-network the number of all meaningful actions satisfies
4b
√
Mi −N + 1c ≤ |Si| ≤ 2(Mi + 1),
where when computing the lower bound we took into
account the requirement that two drones cannot occupy the
same location.
C. Multistage Game
The formulated game is a game with complete informa-
tion. By the latter we mean that all the players have all
the required information about the current and the previous
network states, and all the elements of the game are common
knowledge. Furthermore, due to the obvious restrictions we
confine ourselves to the class of pure strategies.
There are two types of multistage games: simultaneous
and sequential ones [17]. In a simultaneous game, the
players choose their actions simultaneously and without
having knowledge of the choices made by other players. In a
sequential game, the players take their decisions in a certain,
a priori fixed order. Thus, the order in which players choose
their actions is a cruicial parameter of the game. Intuitively,
the player that is the last to decide has an advantage of the
others.
Below, we will mostly concentrate on the sequential
version of the game. Let σ : N → N be a bijective map
(permutation of N ) defining the sequence of moves. We
will refer to σ as the move sequence. At each stage, the
players make their choices according to this sequence, i.e.,
first moves the player σ(1), then σ(2) and so forth. Each
player places its drone in order to minimise the diameter of
the respective graph. Initially, all drones are in the starting
location Qo = {qo, . . . , qo}. When the ith player moves
the set Q updates: Q = Q−i ∪ {q¯i}, where q¯i is the
solution of the respective optimisation problem (1). Note
that the decisions taken by subsequent players may change
the pay-off function of the player that made its move before.
Therefore, the final value of the pay-off function is computed
at the end of the stage, when all players have made their
moves.
D. Solutions and Equilibria
We are interested in two particular types of solutions to
the considered game: a cooperative solution and a Nash
equilibrium solution. Below, we give a formal definition of
these concepts for the case of S-network. All formulated
results will hold, mutatis mutandis, for the case of a J-
network.
Definition 1. The solution QNE = {qNEi }i∈N is said to be
the Nash equilibrium solution if for any i ∈ N the following
holds:
Hi(G, QNE) ≥ Hi(G, QNE−i )
where QNE−i = {qNEj }j 6=i ∪ {qi}, qi ∈W ∗i .
This condition can be reformulated in terms of graph
diameters:
D(GSi ∪QNE ,Vi) ≤ D(GSi ∪QNE−i ,Vi),
In plain words, this means that any player cannot improve
its payoff function (i.e., decrease the diameter of its graph)
by unilaterally changing the position of its drone.
Definition 2. The solution QC is said to be the cooperative
solution if it minimises the sum of all individual payoff
functions:





where W ∗ = W ∗1×W ∗2×. . .×W ∗N is the set of all admissible
control actions.
Note that the cooperative solution always exists, as fol-
lows from the finiteness of the set of actions. Obviously,
it can be non-unique. The case of Nash equilibrium is,
however, more subtle.
While our dynamic game is represented in a strategic (nor-
mal) form, because of the presence of sequential decision-
making, an alternative representation highliting the sequence
of the moves can be used. The sequence of moves is thus
represented in a game-tree form, which is called an extensive
form. It is known that every finite extensive-form game with
perfect information has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
[17]. However, the existence of the Nash equilibrium does
not imply that the game has a finite extensive-form repre-
sentation.
That is to say, even the Nash equilibrium solution exists,
it may happen that it cannot be reached by any sequence
of players’ moves. Such situation occurs when the Nash
equilibrium solution contains certain configuration of drones
which we will call coherent structures. One typical example
of a coherent structure is shown in Fig. 1. In this figure, 3
drones form a bridge, the stucture which cannot be reached
without some extra coordination between players. When the
Nash equilibrium cannot be reached, the game will have a
periodic solution. This is similar to the situation observed
in the theory of dynamic systems when a stable limit cycle
surrounds an equilibrium point.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The simulation of the multi-staged game for the S-
network has been implemented in MATLAB for two players.
For testing purposes the world was restricted by an 8 × 8
Figure 1. The figure illustrates the case of a 3-bridge connecting the agents
of three different players (shown as a square, a triangle and a cross). The
respective mobile agents are encircled. The figure presents a fragment of
the total communication network.
rectangular grid. A number of restricted areas were intro-
duced, those which can be thought of as obstacles which
prevent player placing agents, i.e. where there might be a
lake or building. (see Figures 2, 3). Only mobile agents are
allowed to be placed there. For each player, the placement
algorithm places a predefined number of nodes randomly
on the grid whilst ensuring a connected graph. Then the




1, d(vi, vj) = 1
0, otherwise.
A modified Dijkstra algorithm was used to calculate the
lengths of the paths between the agents for each player [18].
Note that the lengths were computed only for the nodes
from a given subset as described in Sec. II-B The length of
the longest path was stored as the player’s initial diameter.
The code then checked if there was any competition for
drones position by playing the first stage of the game. After
a suitable number of game situations were generated and
stored, the game itself was played. The game consisted of a
compulsory first stage and then later stages run continuously
until none of the players could decrease their diameter.
We present two examples here, one is a game situation
with one restricted area (lake), the second illustrates the
situation when one of the players finds a new position for
their drone which increases the diameter of another player.
Players consider their own diameter optimisation, however
sometimes the use of the second drone can be seen by us
as a bridge building process. We should emphasize that the
game is non-cooperative, and the players have no intention
to build a bridge at any stage.
Example 1 which is depicted on Fig. 2 presents a situation
when a bridge is not available at the first stage. The first
player moves the drone to (6, 4) (see Table I) and leaves the
second player with 11 options minimising the diameters to
14 and 13 correspondingly, which means the pay-off after
stage 1 is [2, 2].
However, at stage 2 opportunities for the better use of
Figure 2. Initial placement of agents in Example 1. Two 2-bridges appeared
((3, 3) − (4, 5) and (4, 3) − (4, 4)) as results of the second stage of the
game.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE 1: STAGE 1
Diameters Drone 1 Drone 2 Diameters Payoff
initial position position updated current
[16, 15] (6, 4) (7, 2) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (1, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (2, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (3, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (4, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (5, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (1, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (2, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (3, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (4, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
[16, 15] (6, 4) (5, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
the second player’s drone for the first player are formed
(see Table II), i.e., two 2-bridges appear ((3, 3)− (4, 5) and
(4, 3)− (4, 4)). Each of the strategies result in pay-off [16−
10, 15 − 9] = [6, 6]. The third 2-bridge is also available
((5, 3)−(5, 4)), but it only brings the payoff of [16−12, 15−
11] = [4, 4]. For the rest of the strategies, both players can
not improve achievements of the first stage.
Example 2 has been generated randomly on the field with
three lakes (Fig. 2) and it illustrates the non-cooperative
nature of this game. The initial diameters for the players
are 15 and 12 correspondingly (see Table III).
The first player has the only minimising position (4, 6)
which brings 11 options for the second player. The pay-off
function after stage 1 is [15 − 13, 12 − 11] = [2, 1] for all
11 strategies.
The next stage begins with the first player’s attempt to
minimise its diameter by using the second drone. Thus some
of the strategies give multiple options and the total number
of strategies becomes 13 (see Table IV). The first 5 strategies
TABLE II
EXAMPLE 1: STAGE 2
Drone 1 Drone 2 Diameters Payoff
position position updated total
(6, 4) (7, 2) [14, 13] [2, 2]
(6, 4) (1, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
(6, 4) (2, 3) [14, 13] [2, 2]
(6, 4)→ (3, 4) (3, 3) [14→ 10, 13→ 9] [6, 6]
(6, 4)→ (4, 4) (4, 3) [14→ 10, 13→ 9] [6, 6]
(6, 4)→ (5, 4) (5, 3) [14→ 12, 13→ 11] [4, 4]
(6, 4) (1, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
(6, 4) (2, 4) [14, 13] [2, 2]
(6, 4)→ (3, 3) (3, 4) [14→ 10, 13→ 9] [6, 6]
(6, 4)→ (4, 3) (4, 4) [14→ 10, 13→ 9] [6, 6]
(6, 4)→ (5, 3) (5, 4) [14→ 12, 13→ 11] [4, 4]
Figure 3. Initial placement of agents in Example 2. Only one 2-bridge
position is potentially available ((4, 5)−(5, 5)), however, the second player
prefers to have a drone at (4, 6) in most of the cases.
TABLE III
EXAMPLE 2: STAGE 1
Diameters Drone 1 Drone 2 Diameters Payoff
initial position position updated current
[15, 12] (4, 6) (4, 1) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (2, 2) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (5, 2) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (2, 3) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (2, 4) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (4, 4) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (2, 5) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (4, 5) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (5, 5) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (5, 8) [13, 11] [2, 1]
[15, 12] (4, 6) (6, 8) [13, 11] [2, 1]
do not allow any improvements (as well as strategies 7, 10
and 11) for both players, then make no changes to the
drones’ positions. However the 6−th strategy (drone 1 at
TABLE IV
STAGE 2 EXAMPLE 2
Drone 1 Drone 2 Diameters Payoff
position position updated total
(4, 6) (4, 1) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6) (2, 2) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6) (5, 2) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6) (2, 3) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6) (2, 4) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6)→ (5, 4) (4, 4)→ (4, 6) [13→ 12→ 15, 11] [0, 1]
(4, 6) (2, 5) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6)→ (5, 5) (4, 5) [13→ 12, 11] [3,1]
(4, 6)→ (5, 5) (4, 5)→ (4, 6) [13→ 12→ 15, 11] [0, 1]
(4, 6)→ (4, 5) (5, 5) [12, 11] [3,1]
(4, 6)→ (4, 5) (5, 5)→ (4, 6) [13→ 12→ 15, 11] [0, 1]
(4, 6) (5, 8) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6) (6, 8) [13, 11] [2, 1]
(4, 6), drone 2 at (4, 4)) gives an opportunity for the first
player to use the second drone as a 2-bridge ((5, 4), (4, 4))
which brings the diameter to 12 for both of the players.
Now the second player finds a better position for the second
drone, namely (4, 6), which bring the diameter down to 11,
however that action increases the diameter of the first player
to 15. Very similar situation happens with strategy 10 (see
Table IV).
Strategy 8, where the first drone was at (4, 6) and the
second one at (4, 5) after the first stage, allows the 2-bridge
((4, 5)− (5, 5)) to appear after second stage minimisation.
Strategy number 10 is more special, it allows two options
for the position of the second drone ((4, 5) and (4, 5)) after
the first drone was moved to (5, 5). Both makes the diameter
of the second player being 11. However, only the first one
leaves the diameter of the first player being 12, the second
one makes it 15.
Thus two strategies lead to the bridge formation and bring
the maximal total network improvement, but at the same
time, two strategies degrade the total payoff comparing with
the outcomes of the first stage.
V. CONCLUSION
A novel game-theoretic model of mobile agents place-
ment on a mobile ad-hoc network was considered. It was
shown that this non-cooperative problem have interesting
properties. In particular, it may happen that the neither
of the described strategies can lead the players to a Nash
equilibrium solution. It is therefore interesting to consider
different classes of strategies and solutions. The future
research will include a detailed analysis of the observed
phenomena and will concentrate on the design of new classes
of strategies, including cooperative ones, to allow all players
achieving the best possible outcomes.
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